In this paper we are concerned with the existence of optimal stationary policies for in nite horizon risk sensitive Markov control processes with denumerable state space, unbounded cost function, and long run average cost. Introducing a discounted cost dynamic game, we prove that its value function satis es an Isaacs equation, and its relationship with the risk sensitive control problem is studied. Using the vanishing discount approach, we prove that the risk-sensitive dynamic programming inequality holds, and derive an optimal stationary policy.
Introduction
In this paper we are concerned with the existence of optimal stationary policies for in nite horizon risk sensitive stochastic control problems with denumerable state space, discrete time parameter, unbounded cost function, and long run average cost. For the risk neutral stochastic control problem, the same kind of problem has been addressed, see e.g. CC, CC-S, S1, S2, HL-L1, HL-L2], exploiting the vanishing discount approach, in which the value function of the average cost control problem is approximated by the value function of a sequence of discounted problems. However, for the risk sensitive control problem there does not seem to be a sequence of discounted control problems with which we can approximate the value function of the average cost problem. Therefore, we introduce a dynamic game, and consider both the discounted and the average cost criteria. Establishing some relationships (see Theorem 3.1) between the value function of the average cost dynamic game and the value function of the risk sensitive control problem, it is possible to approximate the value function of the risk-sensitive control problem through the value function of a discounted cost dynamic game, which satises an Isaacs equation. Then, using well-known techniques of the vanishing discount approach, we prove the existence of a solution to the risk sensitive dynamic programming inequality (DPI), and derive an optimal stationary policy. In HH-M] was proved that there exists a bounded solution to the risk sensitive dynamic programming equation (DPE), under conditions that force the controlled process to have very strong recurrence properties for all stationary policies. In this paper we introduce weaker assumptions, and prove the existence of a solution to the DPI.
The use of game theory to solve this problem is not surprising, and it has been explored extensively in the study of risk sensitive control problems B-J, F-HH, F-McE, F-McE1, DP-M-R, W]. See also FG-M], where risk sensitive control problems for hidden Markov models were treated. A key tool for establishing the relationships between dynamic games and the risk sensitive control problem is a variational lemma, that express the duality relationship between the relative entropy function and the logarithmic moment generating function. Recently, Dupuis and Ellis D-E] found interesting applications of this lemma in their study of representation formulas and weak convergence methods.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the control model we will deal with. In Section 3 we introduce some preliminary results, and nally section 4 contains the main result.
Preliminaries
The control model. Let the set of probability measures on A, such that t (x)(A(x)) = 1. We denote by M the set of Markov policies, and throughout we restrict ourselves, without loss of generality, to this set of control policies. We denote by F the set of functions f : S ! A such that f(x) 2 A(x) for all x 2 S. A policỹ 2 is stationary if there exists f 2 F such that t (f(x t )jh t ) = 1 for all h t 2 H t ; t 0; this policy will also be denoted by f 2 F.
If the initial state x 2 S and~ 2 M are given, there exists a unique probability measure P~ x on ( ; ), the canonical measurable space that consists of the sample space := (S A) 1 and the corresponding product -algebra . Further, a stochastic process f(x t ; a t ); t = 0; 1; : : :g is de ned in a canonical way, where x t and a t denote the state and action at time t, respectively. The expectation operator with respect to P~ x is denoted by E~ x .
Next we introduce the risk-sensitive cost criterion. For x 2 S;~ 2 M , the cost functional to be minimized is de ned by J(x;~ ) = lim sup
where > 0 is the risk factor. Throughout, without loss of generality, we set
be the corresponding value function. Then, the problem we are concerned with is to nd a policy f 2 F such that
Assumption A.2 (a) There exists a stationary policy f 2 F such that := J(x; f) is nite and independent of x. Remark 2.1. Assumption A.2 is a slight variation of that used in previous literature for the risk-neutral average cost criterion CC,CC-S, B]. However, the way we approach our problem is technically di erent, and depends heavily on the introduction of a dynamic game. This idea has been used in HH-M], where dynamic programming techniques were used to prove the existence of optimal solutions to the risk-sensitive stochastic control problem with bounded cost function, and in F-HH] for nite state problems.
In the remainder of this section we shall give a su cient condition for Assumption A.2.(a). See D-S, Theorem 2.1.10]. Let f 2 F, and let x t be the Markov chain with transition kernel (yjx; f(x)).
Let P(S) be the set of probability vectors on S, i.e. 3 Stochastic dynamic games . The set S is the state space, while A and P(S) are the control sets for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. The reward function is (x; a; ) ! c(x; a) ? I( jj ( jx; a)), with (x; a; ) 2 K P(S). The evolution of the system is as follows. Let x t be the state at time t 2 f0; 1; : : :g, and a t ; t the actions chosen by Player 1 and Player 2, respectively.
P(S)
Then a reward c(x t ; a t ) ? I( t jj ( jjx t ; a t )) is earned, and the system moves to the next state x t+1 according to the probability distribution t .
For each t 0, let N t ; K t be the set of feasible histories up to time t for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. That is, N 0 = S and N t = (S P(S)) t S, while K 0 = K and K t = K t K. We say thatf is stationary if, for all t 0; f t = f 2 F is independent of t. A randomized Markov strategy for Player 1 is a sequence~ = f t g of functions from S to P(A), such that t (x)(A(x)) = 1; with some abuse in notation, we denote this set of strategies as M . A non-randomized Markov strategy for Player 1 is a sequencef = ff t g of functions f t from S to A, such that f t (x) 2 A(x). A non-randomized Markov strategy for Player 2 is a sequence~ = f t g of stochastic kernel t on S given K. Analogously,~ is stationary if, for all t 0; t = : K ! P(S). Let ( ; ) be the canonical measurable space. Given the initial state x 2 S, and strategies~ ;~ , there exist a unique probability measure P~ ;~ x and again, a stochastic process fx t ; a t ; t 0g is de ned on ( ; ) in a canonical way, where x t denotes the state at time t of the system, and a t is the action for Player 1. The corresponding expectation operator is denoted by E~ ;~ I( t ( jx t ; a t )k ( jx t ; a t )) < 1:
We denote this set by Q(~ ). Note that this set is not empty; = 2 Q(~ ).
We de ne, analogously, the value function with average optimality criterion. The following theorem is the basis for the existence of bounds which are used in the vanishing discount method. Proof. We rst prove (3.3) for k = T ? 1. Given x 2 S, we assume that J T?1;T?1 (x;~ ) < 1, since otherwise (3.3) is obvious. Then, Now, we assume that (3.3) holds for k = n + 1 : : : ; T ? 1. Let x 2 S be such that J n;T?1 (x;~ ) < 1, and choose any~ 2 Q(~ ) such that n;T?1 (x;~ ;~ ) := E~ ;~ x T?1 X t=n c(x t ; a t ) ? I( t jj ( jx t ; a t ))]jx n = x] is nonnegative. Then, n;T?1 (x;~ ;~ ) = E~ ;~ x c(x n ; a n ) ? I( n jj ( jx n ; a n )) + Z n+1;T?1 (y;~ ;~ ) n (dyjx n ; a n )jx n = x] E~ ;~ c(x n ; a n ) ? I( n jj ( jx n ; a n )) + Z n+1;T?1 (y;~ ) n (dyjx n ; a n )jx n = x] E~ ;~ c(x n ; a n ) ? I( n jj ( jx n ; a n )) + Z J n+1;T?1 (y;~ ) n (dyjx n ; a n )jx n = x] where we have used part (a) of the theorem. Therefore, letting n ! 1 in (3.5), and using part (b), we obtain M J(x;~ ):
Since M was chosen arbitrarily, this inequality implies that J(x;~ ) = 1, which is a contradiction. Thus (x;~ ;~ ) < 1. Then, using essentially the same kind of arguments as in (3.5), (3.4) follows. where (x; a) = f 2 P(S) : I( jj ( jjx; a)) < 1g. Letting n ! 1, this implies that (x) V (x; f;~ ):
Since~ was chosen arbitrarily, we have that
(3.7)
To prove the reverse inequality, we shall use the fact that the function n is the value function of the n-stage problem with terminal cost zero (c.f. HL-L]). The proof of this fact is standard and is left to the reader. Thus, for each x 2 S, n (x) = inf Lemma 3.3. There exists a nite set G and 0 2 (0; 1) such that for each 2 ( 0 ; 1), with 0 as in Lemma 3.2, and x 2 S V (x) ? V (x ) 0 for some x 2 G.
In addition, for any sequence f n g converging to 1, there exist a subsequence f n k g such that the sequence fx n k g is constant.
The proof of this lemma is a slight variation of the one given by CavazosCadena CC] (see also CC-S]), and we omit it.
Risk-sensitive optimal controls
In this section we present our main result (c.f. HL-L2] for similar results in the risk neutral case). for all x 2 H. Proof. Let f n g be a sequence in (0; 1) converging to 1, and take a subsequence (also denoted by f n g) as in Lemma 3.3, labeling by e the common value of the sequence fx n g. Following a standard approach, we de ne n := (1? n )V n (e); W n (x) := V n (x)?V n (e), and W (x) := V (x)?V (e), and rewrite (3.6), using Lemma A.1, as e n+Wn(x) = min On the other hand, from the de nition of the function W, it follows that at least e belongs to H. Now, let f 2 F achieve the minimum on the r.h.s. of (4.2).
It remains to prove that f is optimal. First, we shall prove that for any where the last inequality follows from standard properties of conditional expectations and the Markov property. Therefore, J(x; f ) :
(4.5)
Then, (4.5) and (4.3) imply the optimality of f .
